

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks To 5 & 7: Arrived too late for meeting.
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For Executive Secretary
7 Jul 86
Date _____

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 3, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
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SUBJECT: South Africa Work Plan

A scenario for possible actions on South Africa is attached at Tab 1. A list of illustrative measures follows at Tab 2. We propose that our decision-making process proceed in the following manner, bearing in mind the urgency of the situation:

- First, we propose that a special interdepartmental group be formed under the leadership of Under Secretary for Political Affairs Mike Arracost to refine a game plan for use in the coming weeks. We propose that the group include no more than two representatives from the NSC, State, DOD/ISA, CIA/DCI. Representatives from Treasury and Commerce would be invited to attend subsequent sessions as appropriate. The first meeting of the group should take place on Monday, July 7.
- Secretary Shultz will be consulting SFRC Chairman Lugar on Monday, July 7, to explore our room for maneuver and the timing and content of possible measures.
- State is preparing a draft Presidential speech which will be delivered in your hands no later than Wednesday, July 9.
- Based on the work of the special interdepartmental group, State will prepare testimony for the Secretary's use before the SFRC approximately July 23. Our target for the testimony will be July 16.
- We are intensifying consultations with key allies, particularly the British. The Quad (US, UK, France and FRG) will meet in Washington July 9. We expect to provide you with a readout of Foreign Secretary Howe's trip to South Africa by July 14.


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-2-

The attached scenario covers a range of actions that would flow from this initiative; e.g., emissaries, allied consultations, coordination with Senate Republicans, initiatives with the Frontline States.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab 1: Scenario
Tab 2: Illustrative measures

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Scenario for Actions on South Africa

As agreed at the Secretary's meeting with the President on July 2, the Department proposes an initiative on South Africa to be unveiled by the President in a speech just prior to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on South Africa on July 23. The Secretary will then present details of the initiative in his testimony before the SFRC. Immediately thereafter, the Department will initiate urgent consultations with our major OECD allies aimed at coordinating our diplomacy in South Africa. Both restrictive and positive measures that can be applied in concert will be examined with allies. Our target date for implementing these measures is mid-September. Sending a special Presidential envoy to South Africa will also be considered.

While our policy objectives remain valid, the deteriorating circumstances in South Africa and the growing pressure in Congress and in allied nations for harsh sanctions require us to move forcefully and positively, or we risk being marginalized both in the region and in the U.S. domestic debate. In South Africa, anarchy in many black townships, the ANC's burgeoning popularity, white backlash and unenthusiastic reaction to the SAG's modest reforms led State President Botha to crack down on dissent on July 12. The state of emergency and military raids into neighboring countries are further evidence of the ugly mood Botha has revealed in his recent correspondence with both the President and Margaret Thatcher. He appears indifferent to the foreign consequences of his actions and in the short run may not be reachable by any measures, positive or negative, that we take.

The South African government's defiant and repressive behavior, both domestically and in the region, has produced growing impatience among the publics in all OECD nations. House Democrats, joined by some Republicans, have taken advantage of this impatience to pass an extreme sanctions bill. Although the Senate will surely resist this radical bill, it will as surely pass strong legislation of its own unless the Administration takes the initiative.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
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-2-

Meanwhile, the British face two decision points in the near future--early August, when Commonwealth leaders meet in London and September, when the EC-mandated consultations are due to be completed. We need to keep this time line in mind as we make our policy decisions. A united front among OECD nations, particularly among the U.S., the U.K., the F.R.G., France and Japan, would have a more telling impact on South Africa and would also be mutually reinforcing with each country's domestic constituencies.

Under headings below, the Department briefly outlines the elements of this diplomatic initiative. As an attachment to this memorandum, a list of measures is presented, divided between those we may enact unilaterally and those we may prefer to enact jointly with allies.

Presidential Speech

The President's personal involvement will be crucial to the effort's success, which we define as either major, favorable decisions by the SAG that obviate the need for further punitive action (less likely) or as joint action by the allies in September that falls short of the harsh sanctions widely advocated (more likely).

The Presidential speech we propose to inaugurate this effort will have several audiences. Most important will be the American people, whose favorable reaction will be decisive for those many members of Congress who do not favor sanctions but want us to do something. Congress, particularly the Senate, will be an obvious target, as will other OECD actions looking to us for leadership. And a fourth audience, perhaps the most sensitive, will be South Africa itself. The tone of the speech must be such that all South Africans, but especially blacks, carry away a lasting impression that the President understands their situation and is determined to do all possible to help.

By a separate memorandum, the Department will forward a draft of the speech, which will convey a sense of urgency and concern. It will suggest that a tragedy impends in South Africa unless decisive action is taken. It will demonstrate understanding for the impatience blacks have with the present and the fear whites have for the future. Rejection of apartheid will be stressed, as will our concern for what inevitably will succeed it. Communist opportunism will be highlighted and connected with the inequities of apartheid. Our willingness to raise the level of our contact with black opposition groups will be announced.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-3-

Major emphasis in the speech will be laid on what we are for in South and southern Africa. Our vision of a democratic, capitalist South Africa that drives development in southern Africa will be elaborated. The positive role of U.S. firms will be connected with present reforms in South Africa and with our vision for the country's future.

Then, in general terms, the President will announce our initiative and indicate that the time for decisive action is now. He will make a plea for diplomatic and negotiating flexibility and end by expressing a desire to work with Congress in devising an effective plan of action.

The Secretary's Testimony

The Secretary's appearance before the SFRC will be the occasion for laying out our diplomacy with specificity. He will be the Committee's only witness on July 23. We propose that he discuss at length the background to the present crisis, our analysis of the present circumstances, our assessment of the SAG's intentions and our views of the black opposition. He will specifically describe the ANC and announce our willingness to meet with its leaders at his level. He will frankly acknowledge the ominous influences of the SACP within its ranks, but conclude that the ANC cannot be ignored, as the EPG rightly pointed out, and that the U.S. should be actively engaged in fighting the efforts of our adversaries to subvert the ANC to their goals.

The Secretary will then elaborate the timetable for our initiative and announce that we will report back to the Senate by mid-September. Depending on the outcome of his consultations with Senator Lugar, which will begin immediately after this scenario is approved, he will also list the range of measures we are prepared to consider together with our allies.

If Senator Lugar believes that the Administration must take some actions prior to the August Congressional recess to forestall sanctions legislation, the Secretary will use the occasion of his testimony to announce these measures.

Our strong preference, however, is to delay announcing any actions until September, by which time we shall have coordinated with our allies. The delay will also give the SAG time to take decisions that would obviate the need for any action by us. The National Party's Federal Congress on August 12 and the special session of Parliament later in that month will give Botha two proximate opportunities to prepare his party and constituency for decisive action.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-4-

Consultations with Allies

We have already begun talks with our allies and will stay in close touch for the next two weeks. These consultations will be private and confined to the British, West Germans and French. We are the four nations with the most at stake. Immediately after the President's speech, we shall undertake a vigorous and more public round of consultations with these nations and the Japanese. Other OECD partners, particularly Canada and Australia, will probably be brought in at this stage, although they have less to lose materially and more to gain from striking moralistic poses. The Japanese will need to be brought in because truly effective action against South Africa must encompass its largest trading partners. To guard against oneupmanship and aggravating intra-OECD trade rivalries, we should also strive to have any restrictive measures put into effect by all of South Africa's major partners so that no unfair advantage can be gained.

Here the questions of timing and coordination of measures become vital." Ms. Thatcher, with a strong assist from Helmut Kohl, staved off punitive actions in the EEC last week, but managed only to delay a decision until September. She faces the Commonwealth leaders in early August, and will want to be sure that actions taken jointly with us will fit into (and not exceed those taken in) the Commonwealth and EEC contexts. We will thus aim at finding consistency between the measures we can take under American law and those possible in the EEC and Commonwealth. The list at Tab 2 identifies some possibilities and also includes areas where positive actions, mainly economic assistance, might be jointly undertaken.

Special Envoy

As part of the EEC's plan of action agreed to last week, HMG has offered to send Foreign Secretary Howe to South Africa to make a last-ditch pitch to the SAG to end apartheid. He is scheduled to make two visits to South Africa and to one or two countries in the region July 8-12 and 23-30. We frankly do not rate his prospects for success as high, but we may in any case want to associate ourselves with one or both of his missions. A subsequent Departmental memo will recommend whether and how to do so.

In this connection, the Department believes that a special Presidential envoy should be considered as part of this initiative. His message would be a tough one, aimed at

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-5-

bestirring Botha to take decisive actions. The timing of this envoy's visit would be crucial and would probably be most effective prior to the National Party Congress on August 12. A certain amount of publicity surrounding such a visit would probably be useful for our own domestic purposes, but too much attention would trigger Botha's defiant instincts where foreign advice is at issue.

We need also to consider a mission/emissary to the FLS to underscore our positive vision and hold out a broadly conceived carrot of coordinated Western help to salvage/rehabilitate regional economies. The message would stress, however, the need for FLS influence and statesmanship to get SA blacks to the table with serious negotiating ideas, and warn that a destructive scenario will wreck the region.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Illustrative Measures on South Africa

Unilateral U.S. Actions

- Expelling all South Africa Defense Attaches
- Reducing South African official scientific personnel in U.S.

Multilateral Actions with Allies*

- Terminate SAA landing rights (one year's notice necessary)
- Visa restrictions on employees of South African Government and certain private citizens (will have to be implemented according to each nation's consular laws)
- No new investment for non-Sullivan signatories (would be non-EC Code companies in Europe)
- No computer sales to South African Government (here Allies cooperation would be vital)
- Extending arms embargo against military and police (bringing Allies into conformity with our own strict standard)
- Stockpiling of minerals (might require an exception to ban--in some OECD nations--on governmental procurement of South African commodities)

Positive Actions With or Without Allies

- AID programs will expand
- Ask Secretary's Advisory Committee to coordinate study for crash program to help rebuild South Africa's strife-torn urban areas, with emphasis on housing, education, health and business development
- With Allies, review possibilities for mini-Marshall Plan aimed at entire southern Africa region

- * All of these actions can be taken unilaterally by U.S. if necessary

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